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I. INTRODUCTION
The title of this Article derives from one of the best-known articles
in law and economics. In 1972, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed published a paper entitled, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.1 The subtitle was a
reference to a series of paintings by Monet showing the same
cathedral in a variety of lighting and weather conditions.2 The title’s
implication was that the article was offering only one among many
possible perspectives.3 In a similar way, this Article is meant to
provide an alternative perspective on a well-known scene.
The scene in question involves a recondite area of legal doctrine—
the constitutionality of requiring waiver of a constitutional right as a
condition of receiving some governmental benefit. Under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the government is sometimes,
but by no means always, blocked from imposing such conditions on

* Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. I would like to
thank John Yoo and the participants at the Symposium on Default Rules in Private and
Public Law for helpful comments.
1. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inaleinability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
2. See id. at 1090 n.2.
3. See id. at 1089, 1090 n.2.
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grants.4 This doctrine has long been considered an intellectual and
doctrinal swamp. As one recent author has said, “[t]he Supreme
Court’s failure to provide coherent guidance on the subject is, alas,
legendary.”5 This topic is perhaps less inspiring than the panoramic
view of the classical edifice of private law offered by Calabresi and
Melamed.6 This Article certainly does not aspire to a similar level of
impact,7 but it does share with their article the effort to provide a
new perspective on a familiar set of problems without claiming that
this perspective is the only valid one.
The fact that constitutional rights can be waived is usually
something of an afterthought. The perspective offered in this Article
places waiver in the foreground. Despite the Declaration of
Independence’s proclamation of inalienable rights,8 constitutional
rights are indeed alienable in the sense that they can be waived in
return for various benefits.9 For example, in return for government
funding, family planning clinics may lose their right to engage in
abortion referrals.10 Similarly, the right to a jury trial can be
surrendered in return for a lighter sentence as part of a plea
bargain.11 The fact that constitutional rights can be the subject of
bargaining suggests that contract theory might be able to provide
some useful insights.
To the extent that they can be traded for benefits, constitutional
rights can be seen as resembling contractual default rules. A
contractual default is simply the rule that the law supplies when the
parties to a contract have not supplied a relevant provision of their
own.12 Similarly, a constitutional right applies in the absence of a
contrary contractual understanding between the individual and the
government. Thinking of constitutional rights in this way may seem
counter-intuitive, but it can also be illuminating because recent
scholarship in law and economics has provided a growing
understanding of the problem of how to design contractual defaults.13
If nothing else, we are in a position to ask interesting new questions
about how unconstitutional conditions may relate to transaction costs,
4. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2001).
5. Id. at 3.
6. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1.
7. Indeed, given the preliminary nature of this Article, perhaps it might even have
been entitled “Another Glimpse of the Quagmire.”
8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178-80 (1991) (describing the government
funding program and its restrictions); id. at 203 (finding the program constitutional).
11. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
12. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
13. See infra Part IV.A.
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information asymmetries, and other familiar economic concepts.
Contract theory does not necessarily explain all the contours of judicial
doctrine, but it does provide a deeper understanding of the issues, as
well as suggesting grounds for critique.
Part II of this Article explains the constitutional background. It
shows that constitutional rights are often exchanged for government
benefits with the full approval of the courts. There may or may not be
any inalienable constitutional rights; but if they do exist, they are
the rare exceptions. Most, if not all, constitutional rights can be
bartered away in at least some circumstances. This may seem
paradoxical, but it should not be: having a right often means being
free to decide on what terms to exercise it or not.
Part III then turns to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and
explains how that doctrine limits the ability to opt out of
constitutional rights. Using the example of First Amendment law,
this part demonstrates the difficulties that courts have encountered
in applying the doctrine. It then examines the conflicting theories
offered by some major scholars in an effort to explain the doctrine. It
is safe to say that none of these theories has carried the field.
Part IV further shows how the problem of unconstitutional
conditions can be clarified by considering constitutional rights as a
variety of contract default. Contract theory provides some insights
into these restrictions on opt-outs. It would be unrealistic to claim
that contract theory “solves” the problems of unconstitutional
conditions, but it does provide another way of analyzing the issues. It
also helps explain why some parts of the doctrine are such a mess:
the court is essentially trying to police contract terms in a way that
has been rejected as unworkable for ordinary contracts.
Finally, Part V critiques some aspects of current doctrine that place
substantive limits on contracts to opt out of constitutional rights.
These substantive restrictions limit the terms that the government is
allowed to offer to obtain a waiver. For instance, in exchange for a
permit to develop land, a landowner can waive the Fifth Amendment
entitlement to compensation for a property interest, but only if a clear
nexus exists between the property right and the impact of the
development.14 Nothing like this nexus rule exists in ordinary contract
law. We do not, after all, say that a lawnmower can be bartered only to
obtain other landscaping equipment or seeds; it can be bartered for a
basket of fruit, a baseball ticket, or anything else the parties agree on.
From the point of view of contract theory, the nexus rule is a very
peculiar restriction on trade.

14. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
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Such restrictions do not relate in any clear way to identifiable
flaws in the bargaining process. The effect of these restrictions is to
block bargains even when the parties would enter into them
completely voluntarily.15 These restrictions may arguably serve social
interests unconnected with the preferences of the parties, for
example by preventing the “commodification” of constitutional rights
(meaning the loss of their social meaning as essential to personhood
rather than mere marketable assets). The nexus requirement,
however, is an unsatisfactory way of achieving these interests. For
example, if the concern is commodification, it makes no sense to
apply the nexus rule to property interests in land. After all, those
interests are marketable for cash already, so we do not need to worry
that unrestricted bargaining with the government will somehow
destroy their pristine character.
The purpose of this Article is by no means to argue for abolishing the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and thereby deregulating the
“market” for constitutional rights. Defects in the bargaining process are
a serious concern. Courts may also be justified in limiting exchanges for
other reasons, such as agency problems involving government officials
or concern about the social effects of making constitutional rights
appear to be mere commodities. We might therefore expect the market
to be restricted in many ways. Nevertheless, current doctrine has done a
poor job of articulating the reasons for blocking the exchange of
constitutional rights for government benefits. It has done an even worse
job of identifying which exchanges are objectionable.16 We might be
better off if we acknowledged that this market exists and that in fact we
have legitimized much of this trade. We could then have a much more
candid and fruitful discussion about which exchanges to block and why.
In particular, it is helpful to distinguish between three types of
reasons for blocking exchanges of constitutional rights for
government benefits. The first type of reason is the least
controversial. As with any private contract, we should avoid
enforcement where asymmetrical information, imperfect rationality,
or other flaws make it likely that the bargain will not be in the
interests of both parties. Second, as in the case of private contracts,
we may block some transactions even though they are in the
interests of the parties. The grounds for banning the exchange are
clearest when the agreement would adversely affect the interests of
third parties in some tangible way. Arguably, we may also want to
block exchanges that adversely affect the social meaning of
15. See infra Part V.
16. For example, as we will see, the Court has come up with particularly stringent
limits on exchanges between land owners and the government, while making criminal
procedure rights freely waivable without regard to the increasingly coercive context facing
criminal defendants.
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constitutional rights, degrading society’s sense of its connection with
personhood. Third, we may want to block the exchange for reasons
that are specific to public law, unconnected with contract theory. In
particular, we may wish to screen transactions for improper
government motivations or for infringements on some norm of
equality—both of which come together when the government’s
purpose is to single out a politically disfavored group. We should
attempt to be clear on whether our objection involves more or less
standard contracting problems or whether it involves one of the less
tangible grounds. Among its other flaws, current doctrine completely
obfuscates these distinctions.
II. OPTING OUT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Some of the resistance to connecting constitutional rights to
contract law is that we are accustomed to thinking of these rights as
inalienable, if not sacred. But numerous contexts exist in which
constitutional rights are surrendered with some government benefit
serving as the consideration. Indeed, as we will see, some
constitutional rights (especially those relating to criminal procedure)
are, in practice, used almost entirely as bargaining chips; rarely are
they retained and actually exercised by the holder of the rights. Only
the small minority of criminal cases feature an actual trial where the
defendant objects to the admission of evidence on constitutional
grounds. Far more frequently, the threat of a constitutional objection
serves to buy the defendant a better bargain with the prosecutor.
Are there any inalienable constitutional rights? The right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishments set forth in the Eighth
Amendment seems a plausible candidate, but even this is unclear. At
least one condemned prisoner was effectively able to waive this right
by dropping all appeals, even though the state’s sentencing law was
arguably a violation of the Eighth Amendment.17 He probably could
have extracted some concession from the state in exchange, such as
an agreement about the details of the execution or the disposition of
his body. Quite possibly, inalienable constitutional rights simply do
not exist in our legal system.18 In any event, as this Article will
discuss, existing law clearly does make a broad range of
17. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1014-16 (1976) (finding that the prisoner
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights); id. at 1018 (arguing that the state law
violates the Eighth Amendment).
18. Another way of looking at this is that we generally consider nonwaivable rules to
be structural provisions rather than rights. For example, subject matter jurisdiction
cannot be waived, while personal jurisdiction can. We do not speak of individuals having
the “right” to be sued in federal court only if subject matter jurisdiction exists. On the
other hand, we do consider personal jurisdiction to be a due process “right.” See Ins. Corp.
of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701-04 (1982) (describing
the difference between personal and subject matter jurisdictions).
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constitutional rights subject to alienation, even if some exception to
this rule turns out to exist.
A. State Immunities
We begin with some unusual constitutional rights—those held by
state governments rather than by individuals. Governments may
seem unlikely candidates as rights bearers, at least from the
perspective of moral theory, but state immunities have been, on
occasion, as carefully protected as individual rights.19 However, these
immunities are subject to contractual modification.
The Supreme Court has especially championed the Eleventh
Amendment right of states to be free from federal litigation.20 The
Court seems to view this immunity in deep, almost reverential tones.
Recent Eleventh Amendment decisions are replete with references to
the dignity of the states, a dignity that would be offended if they
were freely subject to suit by mere human beings.21 Apparently,
however, their dignity is consistent with being sued by the United
States government or by other states.
Fortunately for the states, and probably for the rest of us, their
inherent dignity does not stand in the way of selling this
constitutional birthright for the proverbial “mess of pottage.” The
Supreme Court has made it clear that a state’s constitutional
immunity can be waived.22 In particular, Congress can offer
inducements to the states to obtain such waivers.23 Thus, the
Eleventh Amendment is really just a contractual default rule that
the states are free to barter away.24 Were this not true, sovereign
19. See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 675-77 (discussing the long recognized doctrine of sovereign immunity); id. at
681-83 (analogizing sovereign immunity to individually protected rights).
20. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. A particularly good introduction to the Eleventh Amendment and its tangled
jurisprudence can be found in Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State
Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1. For further background, see Vicki C. Jackson,
The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J.
1 (1988); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975).
21. See Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1126-27
(2000).
22. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
23. See College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686-87 (discussing the difference between
inducement and compulsion).
24. For further discussion of the implications of the power of states to barter away
their sovereign immunity, see Daniel A. Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh
Amendment, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 141 (1996); Neil S. Siegel, Why the Eleventh
Amendment Always Matters, Even When Transaction Costs Are Zero: A Reply to Professor
Farber, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 177 (2001).
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immunity would be less a pedestal for the state than a cage from
which it could not escape.
Another example of a constitutional default rule is provided by New
York v. United States,25 which recognized another constitutional
immunity of state governments.26 New York involved a federal statute
governing disposal of low-level nuclear waste.27 The statute provided
three kinds of incentives to encourage states to provide disposal sites.28
First, states that already had disposal sites were authorized to charge
gradually increasing fees for waste from other states.29 One quarter of
the fee was used to make payments to states that provided new sites.30
Second, states that failed to meet certain deadlines could be charged
higher surcharges and eventually could be denied access to disposal
facilities altogether.31 Third, the so-called take title provision told
states that eventually they would literally own the problem
themselves if they did not cooperate.32 New York filed suit, claiming
that the statute “commandeered” its state legislature by forcing it to
pass legislation authorizing a disposal site.33
The Court struck down the “take title” provision and reinforced
the state’s immunity from such commandeering.34 In the Court’s
view, the “take title” provision offered states a choice between two
options, neither of which Congress had the power to mandate
separately.35 It could not order states to pass legislation, nor could it
require them to subsidize generators of nuclear waste by taking over
the disposal problem.36 Thus, states cannot be forced to help
administer federal programs. Of course, they may want to do so
voluntarily. But this voluntary participation need not be spontaneous
on the part of the states. The Court also held that Congress could
offer the states inducements to pass the desired legislation, either by
attaching conditions to the receipt of federal funds or by threatening
to preempt regulation of waste disposal entirely in states that failed
to pass such legislation.37 Such inducements were constitutional
because they left the ultimate choice of whether to comply with the
residents of the states in question.38
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Arguably, the Court “invented” this immunity rather than merely “recognizing” it.
New York, 505 U.S. at 150-51.
Id. at 152-54.
Id. at 152-53.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 160-161.
Id. at 175-77.
Id.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 168.
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Thus, the default rule is that states do not participate in the
implementation of federal programs. States may, however, opt out of
this rule and agree to participate in return for federal benefits. The
problem with the “take title” provision was that Congress was trying
to use a bargaining chip that it did not own. It could not directly
order states to “take title” to waste; hence, its offer to forebear from
doing so on certain conditions was meaningless. In contract terms,
we could say that the contract was invalid because the consideration
was illusory, being merely a promise to forebear from doing
something that the government had no right to do anyway.
State immunity is a nice illustration of the reasons why
constitutional rights are generally subject to waiver or exchange. It
would be a burden on states to make their immunities compulsory. A
state may well want to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity to
get a better interest rate from creditors, and it is not obvious why it
should be forbidden to do so. Indeed, one could even argue that the
states have a constitutional right to waive their immunities in return
for other benefits. The Tenth Amendment says that the states retain
their preconstitutional powers except to the extent that those powers
are transferred to the federal government or forbidden to the states.39
The right to waive sovereign immunity to obtain other benefits was
held by the states prior to joining the Union. Power over this right
was not, in the view of the current Court, transferred to the federal
government, which is why Congress cannot simply override the
states’ immunity. It is hard to identify any provision of the
Constitution that even arguably limits the states’ exercise of this
right. Hence, like state immunity itself, the states’ freedom to barter
away its immunity may itself be a constitutional right.
The more general point is that rights often serve to protect an
actor’s autonomy. Part of that autonomy is the power to decide when
to exercise the right and under what circumstances to forebear from
exercising the right. As a general matter, making a right inalienable
limits the freedom of choice of the right holder and, thus, is a prima
facie invasion of his or her (or in the case of a state government, its)
autonomy.
B. First Amendment
Freedom of speech may be the paradigmatic constitutional right.
Despite their importance, however, speech rights are alienable, at
least in some contexts. The Supreme Court has staunchly defended
First Amendment rights in modern years, but it has allowed the
government to restrict those rights in exchange for providing benefits.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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The simplest examples of government restrictions on free speech
involve public employees.40 For instance, government employees may
lose their right to participate in political campaigns. If there is
anything at the core of the First Amendment, it is the right to
support the election of candidates to office.41 Yet the Court has
repeatedly upheld the government’s power to require the surrender
of this right in return for government employment.42
The Court views speech by government employees as being
limited in other respects as well. In Pickering v. Board of
Education,43 a teacher was fired for writing a newspaper letter
criticizing the school board’s fiscal policies.44 Normally, unless the
letter was defamatory, it would have been absolutely protected by
the First Amendment. Not so when the author is a public employee.45
The Court saw its task as finding “a balance between the interests of
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”46 The teacher’s statements obviously related to matters
of public concern.47 However, the Court concluded that the school had
no more of a legitimate interest in restricting his speech than that of
any other citizen because the letter did not undermine the
performance of his teaching duties or otherwise interfere with the
operation of the schools.48 But note the contrary implication: if school
efficiency was affected, the employee might have had to give up
certain speech rights in exchange for the job.
This implication was confirmed by Connick v. Myers,49 which
involved a disgruntled assistant district attorney who circulated a
questionnaire to fellow workers.50 The questions covered a variety of
workplace issues: office transfer policy (her particular gripe), office
morale, the need for a grievance committee, confidence in
supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in
political campaigns.51 She was fired for insubordination.52 The Court
attempted to draw a line between matters of public concern and
40. For other lines of doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 86-87, 158-62.
41. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
42. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
567 (1973); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102 (1947).
43. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
44. Id. at 564.
45. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
46. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
47. See id. at 569.
48. Id. at 572-73.
49. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
50. Id. at 141.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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“matters only of personal interest,” such as employee grievances.53
With the possible exception of “the most unusual circumstances, a
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel decision” relating to employee grievances that
lack public concern.54 Given the employee’s limited First Amendment
interest, the supervisor did not have to put up with “action which he
reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his
authority, and destroy close working relationships.”55 In contrast, a
private citizen who spoke out about similar issues concerning the
operation of a government office would have enjoyed complete First
Amendment protection—there simply is no First Amendment
exception that the government could invoke.
For our purposes, what is important is not the details of the
doctrine but rather the core assumption of these cases that the
government can condition employment on speech restrictions. That
assumption can be expressed equally well by saying that individuals
have default rights to free speech but can opt out of those rights in
return for government employment. As the cases also make clear,
however, the government’s ability to bargain for opt-outs in the
employment context is not unlimited.56
What makes this example especially interesting is that the Court
seemingly has never asked whether the employees waived their
speech rights as an explicit part of their job contract. Rather, the
assumption seems to be that speech rights are implicitly waived.
Presumably, a government employment contract could provide more
protection of speech than the Court requires; for example, by
allowing employees to engage in campaign activities. But unless the
contract contains such an explicit term, the Court appears to
presume that the government has the right to regulate employee
speech. Thus, employee speech is a particularly potent example of a
default rule: free speech is a default right that an employee can

53. Id. at 147.
54. Id. Of the questions distributed by the employee, only the one about political
campaigns was found to implicate any public concern: “the issue of whether assistant
district attorneys are pressured to work in political campaigns is a matter of interest to the
community upon which it is essential that public employees be able to speak out freely
without fear of retaliatory dismissal.” Id. at 149.
55. Id. at 154. The Court concluded that the “questionnaire touched upon matters of
public concern in only a most limited sense” and was “most accurately characterized as an
employee grievance concerning internal office policy.” Id.
56. Id. at 147 (suggesting that the government may not bargain for a free speech opt-out
when the political speech addresses matters of public concern).
Another First Amendment setting involving opt-outs is campaign finance. In Buckley v.
Valeo, the Court held that the government cannot regulate the total level of a candidate’s
spending. 424 U.S. 1, 14-23 (1976). However, it can impose a spending limit if the candidate
agrees to accept public financing. Id. at 90-104.

2006]

ANOTHER VIEW OF THE QUAGMIRE

923

bargain away, and the default rule for government employment
contracts is that the right has in fact been surrendered.
C. Abortion Rights
In Roe v. Wade,57 the Supreme Court held that a woman has a
constitutional right to have an abortion, subject to some restrictions
(particularly in the final trimester).58 But it turned out that the right
to an abortion was a default rule: the government can provide
benefits for women who choose not to exercise the right, thereby
purchasing their waiver of the right to an abortion. In Maher v. Roe59
and Harris v. McRae,60 the Court held that Congress could
“encourage” women to bear children rather than have abortions by
offering a financial inducement, such as payment of medical
expenses for childbirth but not abortion.61 This holding was all the
more remarkable because expanding the funding to include abortions
would actually have saved the government money, inasmuch as
abortions are a less expensive alternative.62 Thus, the only logical
conclusion is that the government’s sole purpose was to discourage
the exercise of a constitutional right.
The Court has also allowed use of government funding on the
other side of the doctor-patient relationship—to induce physicians to
remain silent about the abortion option as an alternative to
childbirth. Rust v. Sullivan63 involved a restriction on abortion
counseling. A federal statute provided federal funding for family
planning services but mandated that none of the funds be used in
programs where abortion is a method of family planning.64 An
implementing regulation provided that grantees could not refer
women to abortion providers, even upon request, nor could grantees
engage in lobbying or advocacy in favor of abortion.65 Finally,
according to the regulation, any government-funded facilities had to
be physically and financially separate from prohibited abortion
activities; grantees that were not able to run stand-alone programs

57. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. Id. at 153-54.
59. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
60. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
61. See id. at 318; Maher, 432 U.S. at 476.
62. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 490 (The “state’s assertion that it saves money when it declines
to pay the cost of a welfare mother’s abortion is simply contrary to undisputed facts.”).
63. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 179-80.
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with their federal funds would be unable to use any other funds to
advocate abortion.66
The Court upheld the regulations on the basis that they were
merely designed to prevent program money from being used for
purposes outside of its scope. “[H]ere the Government is not denying
a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds
be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”67 In short,
although they were by no means government employees, the doctors’
speech rights were subject to the same kinds of limitations that the
Court had upheld in cases such as Connick.68 In return for
government funding, they gave up the right to communicate freely
and candidly with their patients.69
The Court’s rulings on abortion-related funding restrictions have
been particularly controversial. For present purposes, what is
important is not so much the correctness (or incorrectness) of these
decisions but their dramatic illustration of the government’s ability
to obtain opt-outs from constitutional rights in return for financial
benefits.
D. Criminal Procedure Rights
The Bill of Rights provides elaborate protections for potential
criminal defendants. The police cannot engage in searches without
probable cause;70 suspects cannot be forced to incriminate
themselves;71 defendants are entitled to counsel, cross-examination of
adverse witnesses, and compulsory process to obtain evidence in
their own favor.72 As it turns out, all of these rights can be bartered
away—and they usually are.
It is the rare criminal case that goes to trial. Criminal defendants
typically enter into plea bargains, where they exchange a guilty plea
for some concession by the prosecutor regarding sentencing. Far from
being the norm, trials are now somewhat freakish exceptions from
normal practice. Thus, the realities of criminal law are far removed
from the criminal process familiar to most people.
The criminal process that law students study and television
shows celebrate is formal, elaborate, and expensive. It involves
66. Id. at 180-81. However, Justice O’Connor made a plausible argument in her
dissent that the regulation went beyond the agency’s statutory authority. Id. at 223-24
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 196 (majority opinion).
68. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); see also supra text accompanying notes
49-56.
69. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
71. Id. amend. V.
72. Id. amend. VI.
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detailed examination of witnesses and physical evidence, tough
adversarial argument from attorneys for the government and
defense, and fair-minded decisionmaking from an impartial judge
and jury. For the vast majority of cases in the real world, the
criminal process includes none of these things. Trials occur only
occasionally—in some jurisdictions, they amount to only onefiftieth of total dispositions. Most cases are disposed of by means
that seem scandalously casual: a quick conversation in a
prosecutor’s office or a courthouse hallway between attorneys
familiar with only the basics of the case, with no witnesses
present, leading to a proposed resolution that is then “sold” to both
the defendant and the judge.73

In short, plea bargaining is “not some adjunct to the criminal justice
system; it is the criminal justice system.”74
By entering into plea bargains, defendants automatically waive
some important constitutional rights. In particular, they obviously
forfeit the right to a jury trial as well as the right to confront the
witnesses against them. Other criminal procedure rights are also
subject to opt-out through plea bargaining or other mechanisms. A
partial listing of waivable rights would include the following:
(1) The right to appeal;75
(2) The right to sue law enforcement officials for civil rights
violations;76
(3) The right to have counsel present during an interrogation77
even if the prisoner is kept ignorant of critical information, such as
the fact that a lawyer has already been retained to represent him
and is seeking to speak with him;78
(4) The Fourth Amendment right to demand a search warrant,
which is waived by voluntary consent to search,79 even if the
individual is unaware that the Fourth Amendment would otherwise
forbid the search;80
(5) The right to be represented by counsel at trial.81

73. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1911-12 (1992).
74. Id. at 1912.
75. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1990) (finding that the
defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to appeal).
76. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (finding that the
defendant’s voluntary waiver of his right to sue under § 1983 was valid).
77. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
78. Id. at 425 (refusing to adopt a rule that would require police to “inform a suspect
of an attorney’s efforts to reach him”).
79. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“[O]ne of the specifically
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a
search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”).
80. Id. at 227.
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The Supreme Court seems to have limited concern about criminal
procedure opt-outs, particularly in the context of plea bargaining.
Rather, the Court has spoken favorably, if perhaps unrealistically,
about the “give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining
between the prosecution and the defense, which arguably possess
relatively equal bargaining power.”82 Indeed, the Court has
applauded plea bargaining as “an essential component of the
administration of justice.”83 The Court added that if “[p]roperly
administered, [plea bargaining] is to be encouraged.”84
Thus, it is clear the criminal procedure guarantees of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments are by no means inalienable rights.
They are all subject to opt-out. From a practical point of view, their
primary significance is that they serve as bargaining chips in
negotiating the terms of a guilty plea. Indeed, in practice, these
bargaining chips may be more useful to defense counsel for seeking
favorable terms than for the possibility of presenting evidence of
innocence.85
III. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
Now that we have seen that virtually every constitutional right
may be bartered away in certain situations, we need to consider the
restrictions placed by courts on these exchanges. These restrictions
go under the rubric of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
However, the doctrine is in a state of some confusion, and
commentators have been unable to supply an acceptable substitute.
A. A Doctrinal Mess
The Supreme Court’s difficulties in dealing with the problem of
unconstitutional conditions can be seen in a series of recent First
Amendment cases. It is clear enough that the government cannot jail
someone for expressing an idea the government dislikes, but can the
government condition some benefit on the applicant’s abstention
from undesirable expression? The answer is “maybe.” The Court has
struggled without success to formulate a coherent test for answering
this question.

81. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (finding that the defendant in a
state criminal trial may voluntarily and intelligently elect to proceed without counsel).
82. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978); see also Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
84. Id.
85. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (1997).
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We have already seen one case in this area, Rust v. Sullivan (the
abortion-counseling case).86 Rust seemed to create a straightforward
germaneness test: the government could impose restrictions on
speech provided those restrictions were related to the purpose of the
government funding.87 But Rust was not the Court’s final word on the
subject of speech-related funding restrictions.
A second case, Rosenberger v. Rector,88 reflects the Court’s
continued difficulty with this problem. The University of Virginia
used mandatory student fees to finance the costs of printing various
student publications.89 It excluded religious speech from the program
because of Establishment Clause concerns.90 The Court might well
have upheld the Virginia program on the basis of Rust,
characterizing the overall purpose of the program as encouraging
nonsecular student speech (just as in Rust it characterized the
program as encouraging nonabortion reproductive services). Instead,
the majority decided that the restriction involved impermissible
viewpoint discrimination and distinguished Rust as a case where the
government was essentially paying doctors to speak as its agents
rather than subsidizing private speech.91 (The doctors at Planned
Parenthood and other clinics would have been surprised to learn that
they were in the business of transmitting government propaganda
rather than providing medical advice.) Thus, Rosenberger seemed to
adopt a particularly crabbed reading of Rust, taking a
correspondently narrow view of the government’s power to condition
benefits on speech restrictions.
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,92 the Court came close to
disavowing Rust altogether in favor of a decidedly more skeptical
attitude toward government funding conditions. The Legal Services
Corporation (LSC) was established as a nonprofit corporation to
distribute federal funds to local legal aid organizations for the poor.93
Velazquez involved a condition on the use of LSC funds, prohibiting
grant recipients from challenging the validity of welfare laws.94 As
interpreted by the government, the statute barred a legal aid lawyer
from arguing in court that a state law conflicted with federal law or
that either a state or federal statute was unconstitutional.95 Lawyers
could, however, argue that a welfare agency made a factual mistake
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Id. at 199-200.
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Id. at 823-25.
Id. at 826-27.
Id. at 833.
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 536-37.
Id. at 537.
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or misapplied an existing welfare statute.96 When an issue of
constitutional or statutory validity arose after a case was underway,
LSC advised that its attorneys must withdraw.97 The restriction
applied to all of the grantee’s activities, including those funded from
other sources.98
Not surprisingly, both the government and the four dissenters
thought the case was controlled by Rust.99 Their theory was that the
government had chosen to create a program for routine welfare
disputes, not law reform litigation. But the majority, in an opinion by
Justice Kennedy, gave Rust a very restricted reading. Although he
admitted that “[t]he Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance” on
this rationale,100 Kennedy viewed Rust as involving speech by the
government itself, rather than financing of private speech activities.101
The crucial point was that, like the program in Rosenberger but unlike
the program in Rust, “the LSC program was designed to facilitate
private speech, not to promote a governmental message.”102 Kennedy
added that the “private nature of the speech involved here, and the
extent of LSC’s regulation of private expression, are indicated further
by the circumstance that the Government seeks to use an existing
medium of expression and to control it, in a class of cases, in ways
which distort its usual functioning.”103 Moreover, “[b]y seeking to
prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate
presentation to the courts, the enactment under review prohibits
speech and expression upon which the courts must depend for the
proper exercise of the judicial power.”104
Just when it seemed that Rust had been more or less limited to its
facts, the Court gave signs of changing course yet again. In United
States v. American Library Ass’n,105 the Court upheld a federal
statute that required libraries to use Internet filters to limit access to
sexually explicit material in exchange for federal funding. The
plurality relied squarely on Rust and distinguished Velasquez:
The [Velasquez] Court concluded that the restriction on
advocacy in such welfare disputes would distort the usual
functioning of the legal profession and the federal and state courts
before which the lawyers appeared. Public libraries, by contrast,
have no comparable role that pits them against the Government,
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 538-39.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 552-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 541 (majority opinion).
Id. at 541-42.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 545.
539 U.S. 194 (2003).
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and there is no comparable assumption that they must be free of
any conditions that their benefactors might attach to the use of
donated funds or other assistance.106

Clearly, the Court has not yet settled on a solution to the problem of
funding conditions on free speech.
B. Theoretical Confusion
As one author recently noted, “Because of its wildly inconsistent
application by the Supreme Court, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in recent
years.”107 A quick survey of some of the major scholarship reveals how
far we are from any consensus about the foundations of the doctrine or
how it should operate. Consider the works of four leading theorists.
The first theorist, Richard Epstein, suggests that bargains
between the government and citizens should be disallowed when
there is a defect in the bargaining situation.108 One possible defect of
bargaining is the government’s exploitation of its monopoly power.109
Another is a “divide and conquer” strategy by the government, in
which it makes separate deals that make sense to each individual
separately, but collectively make society worse off.110 The idea is that
the government should not be able to use its bargaining position to
deprive individuals of their entitlements. For example, it would seem
to follow from Epstein’s analysis that Rust v. Sullivan111 might go the
other way if the government had attained a monopoly by becoming
the sole provider of health care. In that situation, if the right to an
abortion is to have any meaning at all, abortions (not to mention
abortion counseling) must be available from government doctors.112
A contrasting view of unconstitutional conditions is taken by Seth
Kreimer.113 He attempts to distinguish between denying a benefit and
imposing a penalty.114 In his view, a benefit should not be considered
106. Id. at 213. The two concurring opinions did not find it necessary to reach this
issue. They concluded that the ability of patrons to have the library turn off the filter made
the restriction too insubstantial to raise serious constitutional problems.
107. Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional
Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 914.
108. See Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term Foreword: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26-28 (1988).
109. Id. at 21-22.
110. Id. at 26.
111. See supra Part III.A.
112. Epstein’s effort obviously bears a family resemblance to the default rule analysis
offered in this Article. It differs in some critical respects, however—it focuses on a limited
subset of the possible flaws in the bargaining process, and it purports to offer the definitive
treatment rather than an additional perspective on the problem.
113. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984).
114. Id. at 1352-59.
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“largesse” if the government would offer the benefit anyway even
without the condition—to put it another way, if receiving the benefit is
“normal” rather than a government favor.115 Under Kreimer’s analysis,
the government’s failure to fund abortions might be considered either
a penalty or a refusal to provide a subsidy, depending on the
circumstances.116 If only a few medical procedures are financed by the
government, exclusion of abortion is not invidious and should not be
considered a penalty. On the other hand, if most medical procedures
other than abortion are government-financed, exclusion of abortion
looks much more like a penalty.
Kathleen Sullivan’s theory focuses on distributive issues in
identifying the evils of unconstitutional conditions.117 First, she argues,
government benefits may crowd out the private sector, so that the
government becomes the exclusive source of support and thereby gains
control of individual behavior.118 This is similar to Epstein’s concern
about monopoly power. Second, the government may redistribute
power by extending benefits only to favored groups, as when the
government offers tax benefits to Republicans but not Democrats.119
Third, if benefits are made available only to the poor, who are then
encouraged to waive their constitutional rights, the result is to leave
constitutional rights distributed according to a hierarchy.120 One
message of Sullivan’s analysis is that funding conditions on welfare for
the poor are particularly suspect, since they may result in creating
constitutional second-class citizens, who not only have fewer material
goods than others but also fewer basic rights.121
In contrast to these other three theorists, Cass Sunstein argues
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should not exist
because the validity of a condition should be decided by direct
reference to the underlying constitutional guarantee rather than by
some general doctrine.122 In other words, we should not have any
general rule about when conduct can be the subject of a funding
condition but not a criminal penalty; instead, the result should
depend on the particular constitutional provision in question.123 For
example, whether the government could selectively fund childbirth
115. Id. at 1359-78.
116. See id.
117. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413
(1989).
118. Id. at 1492-96. For more about the question of crowding-out, see infra text
accompanying notes 142-46.
119. Sullivan, supra note 117, at 1496-97.
120. Id. at 1497-99.
121. Id.
122. Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism
(with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 604-09
(1991).
123. Id. at 603-04.
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but not abortion should depend on whether Roe was best read as
creating only a duty of government noncoercion or a right to
government neutrality on abortion.124 Sunstein seems right in
viewing the nature of the particular constitutional provision as
relevant, but perhaps unduly pessimistic about the possibility of
finding any useful guidelines that extend beyond each specific right.
For example, standard defects in the bargaining process may be
grounds for invalidation regardless of the type of right involved.
These eminent theorists do not seem to agree on much of
anything. Nor has their work done anything to settle the debate,125 as
shown by more recent writings in the field.126 This does not, by any
means, imply that their perspectives lack value. Indeed, each theory
is plausible in certain contexts but seems to explain only part of the
puzzle persuasively. One problem may be that there are actually
multiple restrictions on bargaining over constitutional rights;
theories that explain some restrictions may not work for others.
Thus, it may be a mistake to assume that a single test should govern
all unconstitutional conditions. On the other hand, there may be
more structural coherence than Sunstein acknowledges. At the very
least, trying another line of attack on the problem seems warranted.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS DEFAULT RULES
The notion that constitutional rights might be something like the
default rules in contract law may well seem counterintuitive. This
section is intended to show that drawing this connection is less
contrived and more fruitful than it might appear at first blush. As we
will see, viewing rights as contractual defaults suggests a variety of
new insights.
A. The Theory of Default Rules
Most rules of contract law can be varied by agreement of the
parties. For this reason, they are best seen as defaults. They fill gaps
in the contract in the same way that default settings provide
premade choices for users who do not wish to make their own
judgments. For example, article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
124. Id. at 615-20. For a similar argument that Rust is really a case about the abortion
rights of patients rather than the speech rights of doctors, see infra text accompanying
notes 141-43.
125. See Berman, supra note 5, at 5 (“[T]hese efforts, and those by other distinguished
scholars, have left most observers unpersuaded.”).
126. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1184 (1990); Brooks R. Fudenberg,
Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 371 (1995); Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument That the Greater
Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227.
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contains numerous provisions that apply in the absence of a contrary
agreement of the parties. These default terms include price, delivery,
payment, warranties, and remedies.127 Similarly, sovereign immunity
is a default term in contracts between the states and their creditors,
but it can be displaced by an agreement to the contrary.
The choice of default can be important for several reasons. First,
the default rule may be sticky because of transaction costs. If so, as a
practical matter, it could have much the same effect as a mandatory
rule.128 In the constitutional setting, this is often the case, if only
because the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions limits
renegotiation. In the absence of any transaction costs or restrictions
on bargains, the Coase Theorem would make the initial assignment
of rights all but irrelevant. For the uninitiated, the Coase Theorem
holds that in the absence of transaction costs, the parties will always
bargain to an economically efficient outcome.129 Except for possible
distributional effects, it would not matter whether the state had to
pay individuals to obtain waivers or whether the individuals had to
pay the state to obtain rights. Transaction costs are far from
negligible in many situations, however, so the default rule may be
decisive.
Defaults can also be important where bargaining around them is
feasible because the choice of the default may determine the number
of people who need to engage in this bargaining and, hence, the
amount of social resources devoted to avoiding the default rule.130 It
would probably be foolish to make unrestricted employee speech the
default rule if most agencies and their employees would prefer
another arrangement, since they would be needlessly forced to
negotiate the issue.
Default rules can also serve information-forcing functions. Some
analysts view this as an argument for setting default rules that most
parties do not want in order to cure information asymmetries by
forcing disclosure.131 For example, a default rule limiting
consequential damages may not actually fit the preferences of the
majority of contracting parties. However, without such a rule, buyers
might fail to notify sellers of their particular situation because they
would be assured of obtaining compensation if anything went wrong
with the performance.132 A default rule limiting consequential
127. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-204, -305, -308, -309 (2005).
128. Omri Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 651 (2006).
129. See Ronald A. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
130. See Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 563, 567-69 (2006).
131. The leading article on this is by Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, supra note 12.
132. Id. at 103-04.
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damages creates an incentive for these buyers to reveal their needs
to the seller.133 In turn, this information allows sellers to raise their
price in exchange for the risk of higher damages, as well as signaling
to them that they should take special precautions against breach.
The penalty default forces information disclosure in a particular way
that may have little application to constitutional law, but the more
general problem of information asymmetry may be more relevant.
Potentially, any legal rule that is subject to variation by one or
more parties can be considered a default rule.134 After all, most legal
rules are subject to some kind of voluntary modification. Even an
inalienable right can be, in effect, broadened by agreement, though it
cannot be narrowed. Assuming, for example, that the right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment is inalienable, it is still possible
for the government to voluntarily provide even greater protection
against harsh punishments by statute. Thus, from the perspective of a
contract theorist, constitutional law teems with contract default rules.
From a less sympathetic perspective, the contract theorist may
seem to be in the position of the person who owns only a hammer and
therefore sees everything in the world as a nail. Whether this
criticism is well founded depends on which particular problems can
be effectively “hammered” with this particular theoretical tool. The
best way to find that out is to make the attempt. That at least is the
current endeavor—to find out to what extent a particular set of
doctrinal problems can be effectively knocked into place with default
theory. If contract theory can help illuminate the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, so much the better. If not, we can at
least learn more about how waivers of constitutional rights differ
from contractual undertakings.
B. Benefits of Applying Default Rule Theory
The plea bargaining context illustrates some of the analytic
traction that can be gained through viewing constitutional rights as
default rules. In a seminal article, Robert Scott and Bill Stuntz
argued that plea bargaining fits the normal paradigm of contract
law, contrary to the claims of some other scholars.135 What is perhaps
more interesting is that they also concluded that the bargaining
process is badly flawed:

133. Id. at 101-02. In his article in this Symposium, Eric Posner disputes this
characterization and argues that contractual penalty defaults are rare, if not nonexistent.
Posner, supra note 130.
134. Ian Ayres, Empire or Residue: Competing Visions of the Contractual Canon, 26 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 897, 899-90 (1999). For a critical view of the enterprise, see W. David Slawson,
The Futile Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 29 (1993).
135. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 73.
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Bargaining defendants are, in effect, purchasing insurance from
prosecutors, insurance against the risk of conviction and a high
post-trial sentence. The pool of defendants includes high-cost
insureds (guilty defendants whose conviction is extremely likely)
and low-cost insureds (including innocent defendants whose
conviction is much less likely). But the latter cannot effectively
separate themselves from the former. They therefore must either
buy the high-cost insurance or else self-insure by going to trial.
Because of risk aversion, many of them will likely buy the
insurance notwithstanding its high price, leading to a
misallocation of criminal punishment.136

The authors then make several suggestions to improve the process,
such as empowering prosecutors to agree to binding caps and
providing safeguards against pleas carrying abnormally high
sentences.137
As that article indicates, viewing rights as contractual defaults
opens up a new set of questions about an arguably unconstitutional
condition by leading to an inquiry about how the bargaining process
might be flawed.138 Such flaws can take multiple forms: transaction
costs, information asymmetries, cognitive defects such as overreliance on heuristic reasoning, exclusion of third parties whose
interests are also affected, or the presence of monopoly power.139 In
considering potentially unconstitutional conditions, we can fruitfully
begin to ask whether particular bargains should be blocked because
of these flaws.
For example, contract theory may help explain why we do not
allow advance waiver of some constitutional rights, though we do
allow advance waiver of others. A suspect can waive her right to a
jury trial in return for a lower sentence. It seems very unlikely,
however, that the Court would uphold a system whereby individuals
waived their jury rights in advance in exchange for guaranteed
sentence reductions in the event they were ever tried for a crime. It
is easy to see why we might be suspicious of such bargains on
ordinary contractual grounds: ordinary citizens have much less
information than the government about the possible utility of jury
trials and their likely sentences. In addition, people are notoriously
bad at processing probabilistic information. For much the same
reasons, consumer waivers of remedies for defective goods are often
considered unconscionable. In contrast, we do allow states to waive
their Eleventh Amendment rights in advance of any claim being
136. Id. at 1947-48.
137. Id. at 1953-60. Stuntz has continued to carry out this research agenda in more
recent articles. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004); Stuntz, supra note 85.
138. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 73, at 1909-11.
139. Id. at 1918-35.
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brought; presumably the states are advised by counsel and able to
calculate their possible litigation exposure. Rather than being
analogous to consumers, states are more like merchants who are able
to bargain for themselves.
Externalities provide another reason for blocking bargains. The
externality problem is particularly significant in the First
Amendment area, since speech is protected in part because of its
potential benefit to the public. The speech most likely to create these
positive externalities is that on subjects of public concern. This may
explain why the government has limited opt-outs by employees for
speech of public concern but not for other types of speech, which do
not create such externalities.140
Third-party effects are at the center of some of the best-known
unconstitutional conditions cases. Rather than dealing with rights
holders, the government can make deals with intermediaries who
provide assistance in exercising the right. This may have efficiency
benefits because fewer transactions costs arise, but it can also be
harmful because the intermediary may not fully represent the
interests of the rights holders. For example, suppose the government
were to enter into contracts with paper manufacturers, in which
those manufacturers agreed to supply only certain publishers. The
resulting bargain would not necessarily reflect the full interests of
publishers as a group or of their readers.
The Court has recognized these third-party interests to some
extent by policing bargains more carefully when these interests are
stronger. For example, in Rust v. Sullivan, the Court said the
following:
[W]e have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of
free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society
that the Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere
by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government
funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of
the First Amendment.141

Ironically, the Court ignored the existence of important thirdparty interests in Rust itself.142 In Rust, the government contracted
with doctors to fail to disclose information to women who might
desire abortions.143 The doctors may or may not have been in a
position to fully represent the interests of pregnant women,

140. See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1991).
141. 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
142. See id. at 179.
143. See id. (“[A] Title X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family
planning.”).
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especially if the effect of the government subsidy is to reduce the
availability of abortion information from other sources. Whether this
decrease in abortion information actually takes place is a
complicated question, which depends partly on whether the option of
partitioning the government-funded activities is possible and partly
on whether the presence of the government-subsidized services
“crowds out” other charitable and for-profit services that might
otherwise enter the market. The ultimate question, then, is whether
the funding condition indirectly restricts the availability of abortions,
in which case it violates the constitutional rights of patients.
Similarly, in Velasquez, the major question is whether the ability
of poor people to raise legal claims is impaired because of such
crowding out effects.144 Perhaps, if government-subsidized legal aid
did not exist, there would be much more private support for legal aid,
which would include law reform litigation. A secondary question is
whether the third-party effect on the operation of the courts raises
separation of powers issues, since the courts are deprived of full
argumentation by counsel in some cases.145 Another way of looking
at the issue would be to suggest that the regulation burdened the
right of private donors to support legal aid, to the extent that the
government had succeeded in limiting their choices to legal service
providers who eschew law reform litigation.146 But this is a tricky
question. Perhaps, without the government aid, there would be no
lawyers to represent indigent clients with constitutional claims
anyway. Or, maybe the availability of government aid for routine
claims will actually increase funding for private groups that are
willing to turn down government aid in order to advance
constitutional claims. We would need to do more empirical evidence
to determine whether the government program will crowd out
private funding for constitutional claims.
Apart from these third-party effects, we may also want to block
certain transactions because they either create or destroy
information undesirably. Plea bargaining may suppress information
about guilt or innocence, “pooling” the two types of defendants in a
way that we might find undesirable.147 We may also object to a
certain “separating” equilibrium.148 A classic example is provided by

144. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546-47 (2000).
145. See id. at 545-46.
146. One reason for the crowding out might be increasing returns to scale in the
provision of legal services. It may be more efficient to have one large legal aid office rather
than a number of small ones, in which case the government-subsidized service could
dominate the market.
147. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 73, at 1911, 1935-40.
148. A pooling equilibrium is one in which different types of actors all enter the same
contract; a separating equilibrium is one where the different types opt for different
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the use of loyalty oaths as a condition for government benefits. Apart
from its other possible flaws, this mechanism allows the government
to create a separating equilibrium in which loyalists take the oath
and dissenters do not. We might well think that this is information
that the government is not entitled to obtain.149 This provides an
explanation for why we reject some conditions on benefits, even when
deprivation of the benefits is not injurious enough to be coercive in
any sense.
In some situations, however, constitutional rights may serve a
beneficial signaling function. For example, by offering to agree
voluntarily to a police search, a person sends a somewhat credible
signal of innocence.150 It is possible that in many situations
(particularly where the search would not be highly intrusive), the
majority of people would agree to the search. In those settings, the
Fourth Amendment protection against search can be seen as
functioning like a penalty default, producing the revelation of useful
information even though most people actually have no objection to a
search. However, this information forcing comes at a cost, since the
effect is to penalize individuals who are not guilty but have other
reasons to protect their privacy. Similarly, a well-functioning plea
bargaining system could allow defendants to signal their innocence
by demanding trials.
Contract theory also suggests that we might want to focus more
on the form of the contract, and in particularly on whether it is a
contract terms, thereby revealing their type. See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Financial Instruments:
Taxing Convertible Debt, 56 SMU L. REV. 399, 414 (2003).
149. Note that this objection is quite different from the classic coercion worry about
unconstitutional conditions. The separating equilibrium works best if the government
benefit is not too large (and thus not too likely to overcome the contrary preferences of
objectors). A major benefit may lead dissenters to reluctantly take the oath, raising both
coercion and autonomy concerns, but spoiling the separation mechanisms. A smaller
benefit is better in terms of collecting information about political views because dissenters
will be more likely to forgo it in order to avoid the loyalty oath. Of course, there has to be
some benefit or otherwise loyalists may not bother taking the oath either. Thus, a mediumsized benefit is the best from the government’s point of view, and the most constitutionally
objectionable from this perspective.
150. If the police always believed this signal, they would never actually take advantage
of the consent and would never search anyone who gave consent even if they had grounds
for doing so, which would give criminals a strong incentive to consent in order to avoid a
search. On the other hand, since conducting a search is time-consuming, police have an
incentive to avoid searching where they think it would be fruitless, even if they have
permission. In addition, if asking for consent is relatively costless, the police may often ask
for consent just as a test when they have no desire to conduct a search; if consent is
refused, the individual becomes more suspect and is investigated further. Here, requests
for consent function as a screening device. The equilibrium would seem to involve consent
mostly by innocent people but also some guilty, with policing sometimes searching and
often declining to do so. This provides another explanation (besides police perjury) for why
some voluntary searches disclose contraband—the suspect was gambling that the officer
was not actually interested in searching or that giving permission to search would be a
sufficient sign of innocence to head off an actual search.
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contract of adhesion. Adhesion contracts are take-it-or-leave-it offers
to consumers, and they have been subject to somewhat greater
supervision than other types of contracts.151 There is some indication
that this attitude carries over to the constitutional arena—or, in
other words, that the courts will be more likely to uphold bargainedfor conditions than those unilaterally demanded by the government.
Some support for this idea might be gleaned from National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,152 where the Court upheld a
content-based funding program for the arts.153 A 1990 statute
required grants to artists be judged by “artistic merit,” “taking into
consideration general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”154 The statute was
passed in response to complaints about two provocative works that
were partially funded by the program.155 The National Endowment
for the Arts implemented the decency requirement by merely
requiring that advisory councils which review grant applications
“represent geographic, ethnic, and esthetic diversity.”156 In an opinion
by Justice O’Connor, the Court readily accepted the criterion of
artistic merit.157 O’Connor also concluded that the statute’s vague,
subjective standards were acceptable given the inherent difficulty of
judging grant applications and that they did not pose any specific
threat of viewpoint regulation.158 The Court seemed comforted by the
fact that these standards did not establish any categorical grounds
for exclusion.159
Government funding for the arts raises some vexing conceptual
issues under the First Amendment, and there is certainly more than
one way to read the Finley case. It seems doubtful, however, that the
Court would have been equally willing to uphold a statute that made
“decency” a flat condition for funding. What the statute did instead
was to make decency a relevant consideration to artists in framing
grant applications and to government panels in reviewing them.160
151. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1174-77 (1983).
152. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
153. Id. at 590.
154. Id. at 572. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)).
155. Id. at 574.
156. Id. at 577.
157. Id. at 584.
158. Id. at 589. In a concurrence joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia argued that
exclusion from a subsidy program is not coercive and that viewpoint discrimination is
therefore always permissible except when the government has established a public forum.
Id. at 590-600 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Souter dissented on the ground that the
statute was adopted because the government disapproved of the messages of certain
artists. Id. at 600-03 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 581 (majority opinion).
160. See id. at 572 (quoting the statute as requiring panels to take decency “into consideration”).
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Thus, it allowed artists to make a low degree of offensiveness part of
their offers and allowed the government to view this aspect of offers
favorably.161 One way of expressing this aspect of the case is to say
that the government was not allowed to provide a contract of
adhesion, which would have allowed artists to obtain funding only if
they agreed to this term. Instead, decency became a subject for
implicit bargaining between the parties, and the Court apparently
found this less objectionable.162
There is some reason to believe that a similar dynamic holds in
the land use area. For example, the Washington Supreme Court
rejected an attack on a development condition:
King County presented Trimen [the developer] with a viable
choice—dedicate or reserve land for open space, or pay a fee in lieu
of dedication. Trimen negotiated a reduced fee in lieu of dedication
for both developments. King County accepted the reduced fees and
Trimen paid the fees without protest. Given the record before us,
we conclude that Trimen voluntarily paid the fee in lieu of
dedication or reservation of land.163

Similarly, California has resisted challenges to exactions that were
accepted by the landowner without a contemporaneous challenge.164
Another example of the Court’s preference for bargained
exchanges rather than adhesion contracts is its rhetoric when
discussing plea bargains. Recall that the Supreme Court has spoken
favorably, if perhaps unrealistically, about the “give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and
defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining
power.”165 The implication seems to be that adhesion contracts might
not receive such judicial favor.
161. More precisely, what it did was to allow the government to staff the review
committees with some people who would be likely to favor proposals of this kind.
162. See id. at 590 (holding that since the statute “merely add[ed] some imprecise considerations to an already subjective selection process,” it did not “impermissibly infringe on
First or Fifth Amendment Rights”).
163. Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 193 (Wash. 1994).
164. See Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
that the failure of owner’s predecessor in interest to challenge permit conditions meant
that the current owner’s claim is time-barred); Wolverton Assocs. v. Official Creditors’
Comm., 909 F.2d 1286, 1297 n.7 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that “enjoyment of the benefits of
a conditional use permit bars a landowner or his successor in interest from challenging any
conditions that the permit requires”); see also County of Imperial v. McDougal, 564 P.2d
14, 17 (Cal. 1977) (both the benefits and burdens of a conditional use permit run with the
land, binding successors); Rossco Holdings, Inc. v. State, 212 Cal. App. 3d 642, 660-61 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989) (landowner forfeited its inverse compensation claim by complying with
permit conditions). California also requires permit conditions to be challenged promptly,
further limiting the possibility of opportunism by someone who has agreed to those
conditions. Travis v. County of Santa Cruz, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404, 409 (2004).
165. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (quoting Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970)).
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The Court is correct that plea bargaining is not inherently
objectionable and that individualized bargaining between attorneys on
both sides helps ensure the fairness of the bargain. Yet, the bargaining
process is troubling for two other reasons. First, increasingly
draconian sentencing schemes may leave even innocent defendants
with little choice but to plead guilty.166 Second, overworked public
defenders may be unable to effectively represent the interests of their
clients in bargaining; they also have a conflict of interest regarding
any individual client since full representation of that client would
require skimping even further on the interests of others. More sensible
sentencing and fuller funding for public defenders would go a long way
to improve plea bargaining, reinforcing the individualized give-andtake that the Court seems to favor.
Preferring bargained-for exchanges to adhesion contracts
promotes party autonomy—a central purpose of constitutional rights.
However, a countervailing factor does exist. Bargaining results in ad
hoc bargains, which may depend on differences in an individual’s
need for benefits or in their bargaining skills. Thus, uniform
contracts of adhesion are preferable in terms of equality interests.
The importance of these equality interests may vary between
constitutional rights—for example, the Court has spoken of the
Takings Clause as being designed to avoid singling out particular
property owners.167 In contrast, while equality may be an important
First Amendment norm, it is quixotic to expect government funding
of the arts to favor all applicants equally.168
Thus, even apart from the greater efficiency of adhesion contracts,
courts sometimes have reasons to favor uniformity of contract terms.
Arms-length bargains may be favored as opposed to adhesion
contracts. But courts may also prefer legislation that requires
uniform treatment of all offerees over individually tailored contracts
when a strong equality interest is involved. In short, arms-length
bargaining may be preferable in terms of the interests of the parties,
but they may raise equal protection concerns.
V. RETHINKING SUBSTANTIVE RESTRICTIONS ON EXCHANGE
Bargains to surrender constitutional rights are subject to two
substantive limitations that have little parallel in private law. One is
the “germaneness” requirement, which in effect limits the currency
the government can use to purchase a particular right. Another is
166. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 73, at 1948.
167. See Justice O’Connor’s recent opinion in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S.
528, 537 (2005).
168. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); see also text accompanying notes 152-62.
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the willingness of courts to inquire into the fairness of the exchange,
a type of price control that courts virtually eschew in private law.
Contract theory provides two important insights about these
restrictions. First, whatever the reasons for these restrictions might
be, they have little to do with standard contractual concerns such as
duress or unconscionability. These restrictions are inefficient in that
they block bargains that both the government and the other party
would truly prefer. This is not to say, however, that other normative
objections to these bargains may not exist. Second, regardless of the
reasons for these restrictions, they raise significant enforcement
problems. They are difficult to police and require courts to secondguess the preferences of the parties. Given these problems, if the
nonefficiency goals are considered important, we ought to consider
whether there are more effective ways of pursuing them.
The best that can be said for nexus requirements is that the
complete absence of germaneness may be an indicator of improper
government motivation. Trying to make fine-grained distinctions
between degrees of germaneness, however, is not only a thankless
task but is unlikely to shed much light on government motivation.
Policing the proportionality of the bargain is an even less useful
undertaking.
A. Germaneness Requirement
The Supreme Court has been at some pains to restrict the
currency with which the government can purchase waivers from
rights holders. The essential concept is that the right must have
some logical connection with the compensation. Perhaps the most
intuitive way to look at this doctrine is to start with the government
program and then view the doctrine as limiting the conditions that
can be placed on that program. From this point, every government
benefit is linked with a set of rights that can be validly made
conditional on the benefit. Although it is less intuitive, we can also
flip the concept and say that any given right can only be “purchased”
by the government as a condition for receiving a limited class of
benefits that have some logical connection with the right. From this
point of view, each right is linked with a set of benefits. Thus, the
germaneness standard requires that any given right be purchased
with a limited type of “currency” bearing a logical relationship to the
right. For example, abortion-related rights can be purchased only
with reproductive-related benefits. It is almost as if we could
purchase sushi only with yen, and crepe suzettes only with euros.
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission169 illustrates this concept.
The owners of beachfront property in California sought a permit to
demolish a dilapidated bungalow and replace it with a three-bedroom
house.170 The permit was granted subject to the condition that the
owners record an easement allowing the public to cross their property
in order to reach the beach.171 The government’s theory was that the
new construction would increase blockage of the view of the ocean,
creating a psychological barrier to beach access.172 Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the Court first concluded that obtaining the easement
outright would be a taking that would require payment of just
compensation.173 He then asked “whether requiring it to be conveyed
as a condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the outcome.”174
In analyzing this question, Justice Scalia explicitly assumed that
the government could have denied the permit altogether based on the
visual impact of the house.175 He also agreed that the government’s
“power to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the
public’s view of the beach must surely include the power to condition
construction upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of
property rights, that serves the same end.”176 Yet without such a
“nexus,” a permit condition would not be a “valid regulation of land
use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’ ”177 Indeed, Justice Scalia
argued that allowing such unrelated conditions on permits would
actually undermine the accomplishment of legitimate land use goals:
One would expect that a regime in which this kind of leveraging of
the police power is allowed would produce stringent land-use
regulation which the State then waives to accomplish other
purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals
purportedly sought to be served than would result from more
lenient (but nontradeable) development restrictions. Thus, the
importance of the purpose underlying the prohibition not only does
not justify the imposition of unrelated conditions for eliminating
the prohibition, but positively militates against the practice.178

In Nollan, the Court found no plausible connection between the
alleged impact on ocean viewing and the requirement of an access

169. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
170. Id. at 828.
171. Id. The public already had the right to reach the ocean by walking along the beach
from other access points. Id.
172. Id. at 828-29.
173. Id. at 831, 834.
174. Id. at 834.
175. Id. at 836.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 837 (internal citations omitted).
178. Id. at 837 n.5.
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easement.179 Such a connection must be a “substantial” one where an
actual conveyance of property is involved, “since in that context there
is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.”180 One
oddity of Nollan is that the Court said that a perpendicular easement
(from the street to the beach) would have had the required nexus, but
not a parallel easement (along the beach itself).181 If the question is
the government’s good faith versus improper motivation, this kind of
hair-splitting is unlikely to prove much.
Nollan seems to be an unusually strict interpretation of the
germaneness requirements. South Dakota v. Dole182 is probably more
typical. In Dole, Congress withheld certain highway funding from
any state that allowed eighteen-year-olds to purchase alcohol.183 The
Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed Prohibition, seems rather
clearly to give states the right to set their own rules in such matters.
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the statute.184 The Court rejected the
claim that the Constitution forbids the use of the spending power to
accomplish objectives that are otherwise outside of Congress’s
power.185 The Court found that the drinking-age limitation was
germane to the purpose of the highway funding, because Congress
wanted the funds to be used to provide safe highways, and underage
drinkers present a higher risk of unsafe driving.186
Judicial review of the qualitative match between the two sides of a
bargain has no counterpart in contract law. This suggests that the
motivating concerns are quite different than those relating to
ordinary markets, such as preventing duress. Four possibilities
suggest themselves.
First, the problem may not be so much with the optimality of the
bargain between the two parties as with the government’s potential
shortcomings as an agent of the public. Conceivably, limiting
purchases of constitutional rights to the use of conceptually related
currency may make it easier for the public to assess whether the
bargain is worthwhile. It is easier to compare apples with apples, so
if we want to make transactions easy to monitor, we might want to
prohibit exchanging apples for oranges. The concern here,
paradoxically, is that the government may overpay for waivers of
constitutional rights because officials have a conflict of interest—for
179. Id. at 838-39.
180. Id. at 841.
181. See id at 832 (“[T]he right of way sought here is not naturally described as one to
navigable water (from the street to the sea) but along it . . . .”).
182. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
183. See id. at 205.
184. Id. at 205-06.
185. Id. at 209.
186. Id. at 214.
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example, politicians eager to stifle criticism of themselves or their
own programs would pay a greater premium to eliminate dissent
than the public would find worthwhile.
A variant of this rationale is that the bargain is one that the
voters might approve of but that the Framers of the Constitution
would not. The Framers may well have thought that criminal jury
trials were a good thing, and they would only be willing to allow the
government to avoid them (if at all) if there were some other positive
social benefit. But the voters may think that jury trials are a bad
thing and that the government should be willing to make sacrifices to
get rid of them even if no other tangible benefits result. In this
scenario, the government is an agent of the Framers as well as of the
voters. Of course, since the Framers are not around to express their
preferences in detail, in practical terms the Justices are likely to take
that role on their behalf.
To put it in other terms, the government may offer benefits for
waiving constitutional rights simply because it disagrees with the
decision to constitutionalize them. Whoever did the constitutionalizing
in the first place, whether the Framers or the Justices, would
presumably want to block these transactions. A germaneness
requirement may help ensure that the benefit received by the
government is something other than satisfaction of an
unconstitutional preference. This may have been Justice Scalia’s
theory in Nollan.187 A more direct solution, however, would be to force
the government to show some tangible interest other than hostility to
the right itself; whether such an interest was closely related to the
benefit offered by the government seems less important.
A third potential explanation is that this kind of restriction on
alienation serves expressive purposes. It allows us to pretend that
what has happened is not really a “sale” of a constitutional right but
rather some more genteel arrangement. In other settings,
restrictions on the terms of exchange serve to reinforce the existence
of separate spheres of interests. For example, society allows sex to be
exchanged for other forms of intimacy but not for money; this
maintains the concept that sex relates to a different aspect of
personhood than market transactions. For similar reasons, we may
be willing to allow criminal defendants to exchange jury trial rights
for shorter sentences but not willing to let them sell their jury trial
rights for cash or for better food in prison.
It is worth noting one analogy in private transactions to the
germaneness requirement. The federal antitrust statutes restrict tieins by firms with market power, whereby the consumers must

187. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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purchase one good as a condition for purchasing another. One
defense is that the two items are so closely related that they should
not be considered two separate goods. This analogy would suggest
limiting the germaneness requirement to situations where the
government has market power. In a similar theory, germaneness
might be a defense even if the government has market power. Yet
even if the government does have market power, and even if the
condition is not germane, the tie-in analogy suggests that courts
should be fairly tolerant of funding conditions. In general, antitrust
courts and economists have become fairly tolerant of tie-ins because
harm to competition is often questionable and tie-ins can provide
indirect benefits to consumers. If we consider an unconstitutional
condition to be a tying arrangement between a government benefit
and the surrender of a right, we would be more likely to accept the
positive side of the germaneness rule (favoring germane conditions)
than the negative side (prohibiting all nongermane conditions).
A fourth theory might be that the germaneness requirement
promotes equality. Consider the paradigm of an unconstitutional
condition, the requirement of a loyalty oath to obtain a tax benefit.
Germaneness seems to be at its low point here. But note that the
effect of the requirement is to obtain loyalty oaths only from a
limited class of individuals, those who are subject to the tax. Why
should these individuals be singled out? Any justification for
imposing loyalty oaths would seem to have zero correlation with tax
status.
Whatever the reason for the germaneness requirement, enforcing
it creates two problems. First, courts seem to have had a great deal of
difficulty in determining whether conditions are sufficiently
germane. Thus, the germaneness requirement causes uncertainty
and litigation. Second, since the effect of the requirement is to block
efficient exchanges, the parties have every incentive to try to evade
the restrictions. For example, a homeowner in the position of Mr.
Nollan might well prefer to get a permit by giving the state a beach
easement, which the Supreme Court frowned upon, rather than an
access easement from the street, which the Court said was allowable.
Preventing such bargains from being made may be difficult.
Nongermaneness is a victimless crime.
Nexus or germaneness requirements seem to be most useful when
two factors are present. First, it is most enforceable in situations
where individualized bargaining is not an option. For example, the
loyalty oath to qualify for a tax credit, by its nature, must be
legislative—taxes are not set on the basis of individualized
negotiations with an IRS agent. Even if they were, the IRS agent
would probably be unimpressed by an offer to swap a loyalty oath for
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a tax break. Thus, the Court can strike down such requirements
without worrying about side bargains.
Second, a germaneness requirement is best applied at a fairly
crude level. If a condition seems quite unconnected with the
underlying program, then concerns about improper government
motive, commodification, and equality become very plausible. If Mr.
Nollan had been asked to sign a loyalty oath in return for getting a
building permit, the bargain would be no more coercive or
involuntary, yet the government’s demand would have been highly
suspect. Nevertheless, the distinction between perpendicular and
parallel easements, which the Court drew in Nollan, cannot
plausibly be linked with any of these concerns.
B. Price Controls
The Supreme Court not only requires that the exchange be in
some sense “like kind,” but that the exchange be fair so that the
foregone right is not in some sense disproportionate. For example, in
South Dakota v. Dole, the Court emphasized that only five percent of
the state’s highway funds were at issue, so that the statute provided
a mild inducement rather than a coercive threat.188 Thus, Congress
could offer the states financial benefits in order to get them to
comply, but it could not make the stakes too high. In other words,
there is a somewhat ill-defined price control regime in the market for
constitutional rights—the government can offer some inducement,
but not too strong an inducement.
Again, a land use case shows this doctrine at its most vigorous. In
Dolan v. City of Tigard,189 a case decided seven years after Nollan,
the Court embellished on Nollan’s nexus requirement.190 Here, the
land was used for a plumbing and electric supply store next to a
creek.191 The owner wanted to double the size of the store and add a
paved parking lot.192 As conditions on the development, the city
required the owner to dedicate open land for a public greenway
adjoining the creek’s floodplain and to agree to the construction of a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway within the floodplain.193
The germaneness requirement was satisfied. The Court found
both of these requirements to have the requisite nexus with the
impacts of the project.194 The Court found it obvious that “a nexus
exists between preventing flooding along Fanno Creek and limiting
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
See Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379.
Id.
Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 387.
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development within the creek’s 100-year floodplain,” for the proposed
development would expand the “impervious surface on the property”
thereby “increasing the amount of storm water runoff into Fanno
Creek.”195 Similarly, the Court found that a bike path would help
relieve traffic congestion in the area that otherwise would be
worsened by the development.196
The Court went on to add an additional requirement of “rough
proportionality,” saying that “[n]o precise mathematical calculation
is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development’s impact.”197
The Court found this new requirement had not been satisfied.198 The
government could not demonstrate any relationship between flood
prevention and the requirement of public access to the greenway, and
there was no showing that the bike path would actually be likely to
offset the increased traffic demand.199 Thus, the Court scrutinized the
exchange to make sure that the government was not being greedy in
demanding more in exchange for the permit than it could justify.200
Under some circumstances, one might have the opposite concern:
that the government would pay too little in exchange for waivers of
rights. Rights holders may sometimes make excessive concessions to
the government. By doing this, rights holders allow their rights to be
purchased too cheaply because certain rights have positive
externalities, and the rights holder will not take these benefits into
account when negotiating.201 Thus, there would be a good argument for
ensuring that the government pays more for certain speech rights
than the offerees themselves would demand. Otherwise, offerees may
sell out “too cheaply.” But it is hard to see how Dolan would have
harmed anyone but herself if she agreed to allow a bikepath on her
property. On the contrary, there would presumably be a public benefit.
The concern in Dolan, however, was not that the stakes were too
low (so the government would get what it wanted too cheaply), but
rather that the stakes were too high, that it was too harsh to
condition the building permit on agreement to the bike path. Thus,
the bike path and the permit had to have some kind of proportionate
value. This type of price control is intended to prevent coercion; the
government cannot make an offer that is irresistible to offerees. For
195. Id.
196. Id. at 387-88.
197. Id. at 375.
198. Id. at 394-95.
199. Id. at 395. The Court’s insistence on an “individualized determination” supports
the argument presented earlier that contracts of adhesion are disfavored. See id. at 375.
200. See id. at 395.
201. See Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public
Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 872 (1995).
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example, in Dole, the Court seemed to attach importance to the
limited financial inducement offered the states, which was only five
percent of their highway funds.202 So a fifty percent cut might have
been invalid as coercive.
Threatening a five percent cut if X fails to do Y is roughly the
same as offering a five percent bonus if X does do Y.203 So Dole can be
read as a ban on government overpricing just as well as it can be
read as a ban on excessive threats. Under Dole, the government can
promise a five percent increase in funding if the state complies with
its demands, but it cannot promise to double funding because that
would be coercive—an offer that the recipient “couldn’t refuse.”
Whatever the reason for policing the terms of the exchange,
contract theory makes it clear that this is going to be a very difficult
enterprise. In private law, courts have long since given up on any
general effort to ensure that prices are fair. Values are often
idiosyncratic, and the parties often have better information on
valuation than the court is likely to have. This does not necessarily
mean that it is wrong for courts to undertake this task in public law,
where the policies may be different. But what it does mean is that
judicial performance inevitably will be quite erratic. We should not
be surprised, therefore, that to the extent unconstitutional conditions
decisions attempt to assess the fairness of the exchange, the
resulting doctrine will turn out to be somewhat incoherent. In
particular, the “rough proportionality” test is probably going to be no
more reliable in the land use context than a similar requirement
would be in ordinary market transactions. If two neighbors were
negotiating over an easement, courts would not take it on themselves
to determine if the price was too high. The fact that one of the
neighbors is the government seems irrelevant.
C. Rethinking the Substantive Restrictions
The germaneness and proportionality requirements—or to put it
another way, the currency and price controls—have four serious
drawbacks. First, because they purport to be somewhat mechanical
evaluations of the terms of the exchange, they save the court the
trouble of considering whether there actually is a compelling reason
for blocking a specific exchange. If, for example, a given exchange is
objectionable because it treats the right in question like a commodity,
the court should say so rather than invoking proportionality or
germaneness.

202. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
203. Only “roughly” because although ninety-five is, by definition, ninety-five percent
of one hundred, one hundred is actually about 105.3% of ninety-five.
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Second, because these restrictions block exchanges that the
parties actually desire, they are likely to be met by evasion whenever
transaction costs allow renegotiation. It is especially difficult to block
these restrictions when the parties have a long-term or repeat
relationship, because denying legal enforceability will not prevent
informal quid pro quos. Denying legal enforceability to the resulting
bargains may somewhat reduce their attractiveness, but it will
always be problematic to get parties to eschew the bargains they
prefer. This may be another reason to apply the restrictions more
loosely, if they must be applied at all, when the bargain does not take
the form of an adhesion contract.
Third, these doctrines require courts to make difficult judgments,
at which they have not been very successful. The First Amendment
cases, for example, show the difficulty of determining whether a
funding restriction is logically related to a program’s purpose, in part
because that purpose can be formulated in different ways. If the
Court were also to apply the proportionality test to other rights, it
might encounter even greater difficulties in trying to determine
whether the restriction on funding was proportional to some
government purpose such as protecting children from pornography or
encouraging childbirth over abortion. What metric could we apply to
make this determination?204
Finally, these restrictions seem at least in tension with the
autonomy values that probably underlie most constitutional rights.
For example, limiting the kind of easement that a landowner can
convey to the state in exchange for a permit is somewhat at odds
with the core concept of property: owning an interest in land
normally means that you can exchange it on whatever terms you
prefer. Similarly, sovereignty normally includes the power to enter
into transactions on whatever terms the government entity prefers.
If a state is willing to waive its immunity to be sued in federal court
for patent infringement in return for increased highway funding,
state sovereignty would seem to imply that it should have the power
to do so. (Certainly, there would be no constitutional objection if the
federal government were to waive sovereign immunity for patent
infringement in return for another country’s promise of unrelated
financial aid.) If we block these transactions, we should do so for
reasons relating to defects in the bargaining process or third-party
effects, rather than on the pretense that there is something
inherently offensive about the terms of the bargain.
The Court has shown particular vigor in enforcing these
substantive restrictions in the context of land use. This is puzzling.
Property rights are inherently marketable, so treating property
204. This may explain why the proportionality test has not, so far, appeared elsewhere.
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interests like commodities is entirely appropriate. Moreover, the
interests at stake in the cases have not been particularly weighty—
the right to deny beach access or a bike path surely does not lie at
the very heart of our constitutional pantheon or even at the heart of
the Takings Clause. Finally, it may be especially difficult to enforce
these restrictions on concessions by developers to the government
because there are so many opportunities for informal bargains
between developers and land use regulators.
Of course, proportionality is a desirable goal. The government
should impose conditions on permits that are proportionate to the
public interests involved, just as it should engage in regulation and
taxation proportionate to the public interest. So, too, should the
prices of goods be proportionate to their true values. But we have
long since realized that enforcing this kind of proportionality
requirement is as much beyond judicial competence in public law as
it is in contract law. Indeed, the Court has recently declared that
even in the takings context, it is not for judges to determine how
much a land use restriction serves the public interest.205 Dollan is an
unwelcome aberration.
The proportionality test applied in Dole has the same flaw. How
can we judge whether a five percent or twenty percent incentive is
proportionate? Any sensible test would require that we determine
the strength of the public interest served. For instance, surely no one
would say that a funding condition critical to national security can be
pursued only with mild inducements. If such a national securitybased condition put heavy pressure on states to agree, so much the
better. Even judging the degree of pressure on the states requires
some sensitive judgments about political dynamics—the effect of a
funding condition depends on the state’s need for the benefit, the
availability of alternative funding, and the degree of internal public
support for the condition itself, not just on the percentage or dollar
amount of the inducement. This hardly seems like a suitable inquiry
for courts.
Thus, as in private law, it seems fruitless for courts in public law
to take it on themselves to determine the fairness of bargains, except
perhaps in the most extraordinary cases. In both public law and
private law, strong incentives may make the recipients feel
pressured. That may be unfortunate, but courts are ill-equipped to
intervene.

205. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The problem of unconstitutional conditions is probably too
difficult to yield to any one analytic technique. If more intuitive
approaches had resolved the problem satisfactorily, there would be
little reason to consider the default rule approach except for
academia’s thirst for novelty. In fact, the best that can be said for
more intuitive approaches, such as tests based on coercion or
germaneness, is that they are helpful under some circumstances. It
seems wise, therefore, to try another way.
Whether a particular constitutional right should be alienable at
all may be a difficult question, and perhaps current doctrine allows
too much alienability. But given that a particular right has been
determined to be alienable, what happens looks very much like a
contract: the government provides some benefit in consideration of a
waiver of the right. It is not too much to hope that contract theory
might help illuminate this situation.
Contract theory suggests a greater focus on transaction costs,
information asymmetries, and other potential flaws in the bargaining
process, along with the possibility of adverse effects on the
constitutional rights of third parties such as clients or customers. This
analysis does not mean a free pass for conditional benefits. For
example, in the abortion-counseling case (Rust), potentially serious
third-party effects were present. Moreover, there may be reasons to
object to bargains regardless of whether they serve the interests of the
parties, such as maintaining a symbolic separation between personal
rights and financial interests, or policing for improper government
motivation. Courts need to be explicit about these justifications,
however, rather than manipulating vague terms like coercion or
germaneness to justify their decisions.
Contract theory is as illuminating for what it fails to explain as for
what it explains. Unconstitutional conditions involve some problems
without private law analogues—in particular, concerns about
government motivation and about equality. Mixing these concerns
with problems of coercion or involuntariness can only lead to
misunderstandings.
Thus, what contract theory ultimately has to offer is not a full
solution to the problem of unconstitutional conditions. Rather, the
benefit is improved clarity in perceiving and sorting out the issues. A
clear view of the unconstitutional conditions quagmire reveals a messy
scene, with complex empirical and normative dimensions, rather than a
crystalline logical structure. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
is not, alas, a cathedral, no matter in what light we observe it. But it is
better to get a clear view of the swamp rather than to fool ourselves into
believing that there is a cathedral buried somewhere beneath the muck.

